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The Problem of Moral Inspiration 
 
Life, at least in the hands of human beings, and very probably in 
those of other creatures as well, is a notoriously difficult business. 
So far, so obvious, you might say, yet it seems to me that there is 
rather more to the observation than might at first appear to be 
the case, given its familiarity, something at once significant and 
not particularly familiar.1 On the one hand, it is of course obvi-
ous to any of its participants that life is difficult: that fact is some-
thing we know perfectly well, so well as to make it seem banal. 
On the other hand, and despite its obviousness, the fact remains 
mysterious, elusive, and what is more, something of an affront. 
We tend to think that in an ideal world it would not be this way, 
that our lives are as hard as they are as the result of misfortune, or 
injustice, or our own failings, physical or psychological, or more 
realistically, of all those factors operating together, reinforcing 
one another. In principle we feel, things should not be this way. 
We strain daily to make them otherwise. Yet upon examination 
the difficulty that we experience seems in fact to be traceable to 
the very core of our existence as rational creatures, in which our 
condition as creatures is as significant as our rationality.  
 
In even the most straightforward situations in our everyday lives 
it is so often so very hard to know just what one ought to think 
and what one what ought to do, and the challenge, mysteriously 
and without rational failing, seems to lie, if only in part and yet 
inescapably, in the very acts of thinking and doing, to be as much 
a matter of reflection as of what is reflected upon. So some of the 
                                            
1 The you doing the saying here was John Gardner. Death sharpens the need 
to pay tribute. 
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difficulty that we experience undoubtedly stems from conflicts of 
values in the options before us, the sorts of things that afterwards 
give rise in us to a tempered species of regret, as we seek to rec-
oncile, as best we can, the returns from what we have committed 
ourselves to and the losses that are attendant upon it, always in 
full awareness that reconciliation is just as unavailable to us as the 
values are in conflict. Life as we know it is fraught partly because 
of reasons like that, reasons that are a function of what is reflect-
ed upon, whether before or after the fact. Yet there is more, and 
it runs to the architecture of decision-making itself, as to which 
we seem not only to be but always to have been ambivalent, and 
that because we are rationally rather than psychologically bound 
to be so. Just what is it that makes rational decision so troubling 
and so vulnerable? Just what makes it go wrong? 
 
Sometimes our decision-making is liable to be flawed for reasons 
that we can anticipate or at least recognize after the fact. Perhaps 
we are overly emotional: in my youth, when I was a hot-metal 
typesetter, I used to walk very slowly away from a cranky piece 
of machinery, to the end of a long room, and then slowly back 
again, as slowly as was necessary for my frustration to subside. 
Perhaps we are overly focussed on ourselves, or what is much the 
same thing, on values and interests that we have special experi-
ence in and affinity for. In such cases we archetypically try to step 
back, detach ourselves from our commitments, put ourselves in 
the shoes of others, so as to see the world as others see it, or 
more precisely, as it would be seen by others as detached as we 
have sought to make ourselves. Most profoundly, however, even 
when reflecting on matters that concern only ourselves, and even 
when in full command of our emotions, we often continue to 
approach moral judgment in terms of abstraction, disengagement, 
and detachment. Distancing yields a clearer understanding, we 
tell ourselves. When we adopt this perspective we treat the very 
fact of the particular as morally distracting, thus warranting the 
most radical and dramatic form of disengagement from the eve-
ryday in our decision-making. In each of these cases a different 
 3 
species of detachment from the particular expresses a different 
view as to what constitutes moral distraction, against which mor-
al judgment needs to be secured and insulated, ranging from the 
emotional, to the prudential, to the phenomenal. In all of them, 
moral judgment is regarded as characteristically vulnerable to the 
corruptions of the everyday. Our efforts become directed toward 
its corresponding purification.2 
 
In an ideal world none of these distractions would exist for us, or 
more precisely, for the fact of decision. Of course, we do not live 
in anything like an ideal world, and yet the tantalizing question, 
which assumptions about the ideal tend to pre-empt, is how far 
that is actually a bad thing, as the association of moral reflection 
and abstraction suggests, and how far a good; how far a falling 
away from what one ought to think and do, and in that sense a 
source of regret and reproach, and how far a source of value, or 
more plausibly perhaps, of both those things at once. Put at its 
most bluntly, would an ideal world be entirely a better world? 
What kind of scope and existence would it offer to the moral? 
Granted that the everyday is morally vulnerable, is that vulnera-
bility an inescapable function of the everyday, as our practices of 
detachment treat it, or a possible function? In short, is the every-
day a sufficient condition of moral vulnerability or just a neces-
sary one? Most provocatively, and to the opposite effect, might 
the everyday be a source of moral insight, and if so is the moral 
insight a function of its moral vulnerability, and vice-versa? Is 
what makes the everyday morally vulnerable an aspect of what 
makes it morally worthwhile? Does it enable us to live better 
than we could live in Utopia, in certain respects at least, that is, 
                                            
2 Here and in what follows I use the word moral to refer to what reason and 
value expect, not only of humans but of all that is capable of rational response, 
as to which of course there are many different accounts. What I seek to out-
line in this paper is largely independent of the correctness of any one account, 
although it will be clear that my own convictions are realist and pluralist. 
 4 
not in the sense that the ideal can be improved upon, but in the 
sense that it can be enlarged and enriched? 
 
Challenges to at least some of the practices of detached judgment 
are all too familiar, and in many cases more than a little tired. It is 
often alleged that the account of morality that such practices give 
rise to is not fit for humans, indissolubly grounded as humans are 
in various dimensions of their particularity, to which it is as often 
replied that it is not the role of morality to fit the human condi-
tion, but rather the role of the human condition to fit morality. 
Both the allegation and the response are silent as to the possibility 
that the moral might in part be constituted by the human, so as 
to make a degree of fit between the two inevitable without being 
necessary, present in some settings but not everywhere. That fit, 
as and when it arose, would simply be a reflection of the human 
contribution to the scope of the moral, a legacy of the origins of 
certain dimensions of morality, not a consequence of subsequent 
accommodation of them to the human predicament. 
 
Questions like these underpin an almost entirely contrary but no 
less familiar approach to decision-making. Disengagement is not 
our only or even our most common method of reasoning about 
goodness and value, so as to know best what to think and how to 
act. More often perhaps, we get stuck in. In many settings it is 
taken for granted that depth of engagement is crucial to the grasp 
of value. Perhaps the most ready example is that of skilled labour. 
My brother once had a summer job cleaning floors at the print-
ing bureau in what is now Gatineau.3 His boss, M. Nault (Dr No 
to his subordinates) insisted that handling a wet mop properly, so 
as to clean a surface fluently and effectively, was a skill that took 
many years to perfect. Some, including my adolescent brother, 
would disagree on the amount of time needed in that particular 
case, but all but the very young recognize that there are very few 
                                            
3 What was then Hull, Quebec, a sister city to Ottawa, where my brother and 
I grew up. 
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activities that it does not take years to learn to do well, and some, 
such as art, or music, or philosophy, or fine craftsmanship, that it 
takes most of a lifetime to begin to master. Modern employment 
implicitly recognizes this in the investment it has made in forms 
of artificial intelligence (starting with the word processor) that 
have stripped the nuances from the work done by the living so as 
to make it both more easily acquired and correspondingly less 
valuable, and so as much less expensive for the employer as ex-
pense correlates with ease of acquisition and value.  
 
An equally familiar example is that of personal relationships, 
some intimate, others less so, some with human beings, others 
with other living creatures, in which not only is depth of en-
gagement typically crucial to the delicacy that is in many cases 
necessary to successful interaction, but emotion must often be to 
the fore in most aspects of one’s dealings if the value of the rela-
tionship is to be properly registered, as it must be if it is to yield 
itself up in all its possible richness. So one usually needs to know 
just whom one is dealing with and to feel the appropriate emo-
tions toward them on the appropriate occasions in order to value 
them just as one should. Such knowledge can only be acquired 
through engagement, and often deep engagement at that. Hence 
the complaint about impersonal workplaces. Many interactions 
founder because one is simply not in a position to know enough 
to see that they flourish in the special ways that the characters of 
the participants call for. Very often we simply do not know 
enough about one another’s needs and aspirations to be able to 
respond to them with the sensitivity and dexterity they deserve, 
so that our lack of knowledge gives rise to moral failing. 
 
Dispassion is so commonly linked to soundness of judgment that 
many have come to regard the emotions as inherently rationally 
suspect. Yet this is clearly not so, even in what appear to be the 
most straightforward cases. It is plainly a good idea to walk slow-
ly down a long room, away from a cranky piece of machinery, so 
as to allow one’s frustration to subside, just to the extent that 
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one’s frustration is liable to be destructive of a solution to the 
problem at hand, or worse. As I was warned from my first day on 
the job, force in general and hammers in particular do not mix 
with cast iron equipment. Yet frustration is very frequently the 
trigger for inspiration. Without frustration we would be much 
less likely to be inventive, much more likely to keep on trying 
the same things. There is always a balance to be struck, I learned, 
between patient persistence and starting afresh from another per-
spective, and a suitable level of frustration is a vital part of that 
balance. The same is true for a wide range of other emotions. 
Decision-making often depends on emotional investment for its 
soundness. 
 
Finally and most broadly, it is thought by some (most notoriously 
Aristotle) that moral understanding of nearly every kind charac-
teristically requires time, experience, and appropriate attention to 
granularity to master, so that one learns with practice, from one’s 
elders, and in detail, and philosophizes only with age. To invert 
the earlier proposition about detachment, in each of these cases a 
different species of engagement in the particular expresses a dif-
ferent view as to what constitutes moral comprehension, in terms 
of which moral judgment needs to be undertaken, ranging from 
the emotional, to the prudential, to the phenomenal. 
 
One prominent and, for legal audiences, relevant case of this at-
tention to engagement is the practice of law as it takes place in 
and through the hands of barristers and solicitors (as well as trial 
judges, who are in a similar position), whose task it is to acquire 
the accomplishment necessary to bring together law and fact in 
such a way, from setting to setting, as to serve best the needs of 
particular clients. I was once a government adviser on constitu-
tional law, expected (predictably) to be expert in certain clauses 
of the constitution, but also (perhaps less predictably) to become 
highly versed, through close engagement in working partner-
ships, in the missions of certain government ministries, so as to 
be able to offer appropriate guidance as to the demands of the 
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same constitutional provisions (such as the right to privacy) in 
very different policy settings (from housing, to transport, to 
health care). A good lawyer, I was taught, quite carefully and in 
close detail, is one who not merely points out problems but goes 
on to provide solutions, and for a government lawyer such as 
myself that meant being able to grasp what privacy might call for 
in relation to a criminal search, for example, as opposed to an 
administrative inspection. My task as counsel was of course 
roughly to anticipate what an appellate court might call for, but 
within the scope which that gave rise to (bearing in mind the 
open texture of the constitution and the predilections of the lo-
cally prevailing judicial culture) to do so in a way that was rather 
more accessible, sensitive, and nuanced than any court, particu-
larly an appellate one, could hope to be, distanced as judges 
rightly are from many features of everyday political life, so as to 
realize a value for a client that a judge would be liable to realize 
ineptly, or at least less well. 
 
The standard challenge to such ways of implementing principle, 
and one that was regularly put to lawyers whose advice ran con-
trary to the democratic will, or stood in for it (the will that had 
called for a search that lawyers advised could not be undertaken 
in quite that way), was that these modes of settlement are corrupt 
by reason of their very lack of distance. Their received character 
led them to be regarded as the views of the establishment, insuf-
ficiently attentive to new ways of thinking, minority interests, 
and the politically unwelcome. Any good lawyer, we were told 
by left and right, should leave these questions to the courts, and 
the courts themselves should become more genuinely neutral in 
their composition, thought and operations than their critics at the 
time took them to be. The perceived limits of such a project be-
came limits to the perceived wisdom of constitutional entrench-
ment and the consequent power of the judiciary. 
 
The underlying point here, one that has been made with varying 
degrees of purchase against committed moralists from Aristotle 
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onwards, is that engagement appears to licence self-approval, or 
at least to turn a blind eye to it, to the extent of the engagement, 
in that it lacks the essential distance that valid criticism is thought 
to require. On the face of it, of course, claims of that kind are 
frankly conclusory in their assumption that criticism requires dis-
tance. After all that assumption is just what the morally engaged 
dispute and implicitly put in issue by virtue of their practices, for 
those practices take themselves to be capable of self-examination. 
Is the assumption a sound one then? Should we regard it as the 
aspect of rationality, and legacy of enlightenment, that it presents 
itself as being? There seems to be good reason to doubt it. As I 
have just suggested, a good many forms of moral criticism gain 
proper traction by reason of their degree of embedding, just be-
cause and to the extent that it is only possible to be aware of cer-
tain dimensions of the moral from an engaged perspective. So 
skilled workers, or more precisely, those skilled in the compre-
hension of that work (such as experienced critics, those who are 
in a position to be connoisseurs of the workmanship whether or 
not they possess the relevant skill themselves), are best placed to 
evaluate the work in question. That is just what M. Nault (my 
brother’s boss from a few pages back) had in mind, or at least 
sought to trade upon, given that his judgment gave every appear-
ance of also being self-serving. The fact that engagement yields 
corruption of judgment (and M. Nault was employed by the no-
torious Department of Public Works) does not undermine the 
fact that it also yields moral insight. Distance makes it impossible 
to perceive granularity, and granularity is essential to many as-
pects of moral evaluation.  
 
And yet the opposite is also clearly true. Some things come into 
view only with distance, just because the shedding of detail is as 
often morally revealing as it is morally obscuring. Without equat-
ing the metaphysics of the material and the moral, think of a 
photograph that has been taken from a distance and what it does 
and does not tell us. Structure becomes visible, as do certain dy-
namics, even as detail is lost, so that we come to see form at the 
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expense of feature. As it is often put colloquially, and with refer-
ence to the moral as much as the material, sometimes the closer 
we get the less we can see. So we appear to be in a quandary, not 
with respect to different values, for that would be fairly readily 
explicable, but with regard to the same values. Hence the ambiv-
alence about how to approach decision-making that I referred to 
at the outset. 
 
Here is the thought in response. Both sides have simply overstat-
ed their case. Neither impartiality nor partiality, the ideal nor the 
everyday, are either necessary constituents of value, or necessary 
conditions of access to value. Rather they are necessary constitu-
ents, or necessary conditions of access to, certain values only, 
those in which impartiality or partiality are part of the ground, as 
a conceptual matter in some cases, and as a matter of the geneal-
ogy of certain morals in others. (Think of the value of justice on 
the one hand, and that of parenting on the other, and their re-
spective associations with impartiality and partiality). They do 
not play that role in relation to value in general. Indeed they may 
not even inevitably play that role in relation to values in which 
they are part of the ground, for the grounds of a value may 
themselves be mutable to some extent. That means, and in this 
lies the departure from what I spoke of as the fairly readily expli-
cable, that in all cases other than those in which either partiality 
or impartiality forms part of the ground, values are susceptible to 
either impartial or partial rendering, which is the reason that both 
renderings possess what plausibility they possess as aspects of val-
ue in general. Evaluation is itself a practice that falls to be valued, 
one that yields different values when differently undertaken, ra-
ther than a function of the very idea of value, to be executed on-
ly correctly or incorrectly, better or worse. It can of course be 
done wrongly but there are many ways to do it well, each with 
its own reward. Some of those ways are ones that we can assume, 




The Problem of the Murdered Testator 
 
Certain legal cases acquire an especially luminous life after their 
decision, as touchstones for practices of subsequent reflection, 
sometimes legal, sometimes political, sometimes philosophical, 
just because there is something deeply resonant about their facts 
that fits them to turn into parables. I am grateful to Fred Schauer 
for pointing out to me recently that Riggs v. Palmer4 is one such 
case, in that it was already famous in legal circles before Ronald 
Dworkin made it more famous still. As is the case with parables, 
the facts can be very succinctly recounted. 
 
Francis Palmer, a prosperous farmer, left the bulk of his estate to 
his grandson Elmer, with a gift over to his two daughters (one of 
whom was Riggs) should Elmer predecease him without issue. 
Whether from impatience, or out of anxiety that the will might 
be altered, Elmer murdered his grandfather and then sought to 
claim his inheritance. The will had been properly executed, and 
there was nothing on the face of its terms, or in the terms of the 
relevant New York statute, to suggest that the murder of the tes-
tator was any bar to inheriting under his will. Nevertheless, and 
surely not very surprisingly, the court denied the inheritance. As 
the majority put it, Elmer was to be enjoined from using any of 
the personalty or real estate left for his benefit; the bequest was to 
be declared ineffective to pass title to him; by reason of the mur-
der he was to be deprived of any interest in the estate left by his 
                                            
4 115 NY 506 (1889). The occasion for Fred’s comment was a lecture given 
by him at the Surrey Centre for Law and Philosophy in May 2018. I should 
emphasize at once that, unlike Fred, my present interest in Dworkin is meta-
ethical rather than jurisprudential. I am simply using his work as an illustration 
of a meta-ethical outlook that I am attempting to present an alternative to. If I 
am correct in what I say then there is something very wrong about Dworkin’s 
project, but that payoff is incidental to this paper, not its point. Yet even that 
is perhaps to overstate the contrast. Each of these approaches illuminates the 
other, and that is why the structure of this paper alternates between them. 
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victim; and the testator’s two daughters were to be declared the 
true owners of that estate. The choice of verbs here is significant. 
 
The majority offered two grounds for its decision. The first rest-
ed on an interpretation of the New York wills statute which, in 
accordance with accepted canons of statutory interpretation, was 
to be read in light of the intentions of the legislator, so as to ex-
pand or contract the bare language of the statute, as far as judicial 
tradition permitted, in order to secure the legislative intention in 
cases where a literal reading would frustrate it. To permit Elmer 
to inherit would be to frustrate the very order that the legislators 
of the wills statute had sought to secure. The majority described 
this as rational interpretation, and was at pains to point to the 
many legal precedents for it. The second, alternative ground for 
decision was that there was a maxim of the common law, no-
where superseded by statute, that no one should be permitted ‘to 
profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, 
or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire prop-
erty by his own crime’. The equitable character of this maxim is 
visibly reflected in the in personam tones of the court’s decision. 
 
Dworkin called upon Riggs in aid of his view of jurisprudence on 
two separate occasions. In ‘The Model of Rules’ he relied on the 
majority’s second ground of decision to argue that the law con-
tained principles that a rule of recognition, as proposed by Hart, 
was constitutionally incapable of capturing.5 Yet it is a little diffi-
cult to see how Riggs can be read to support that claim. What the 
majority describes as a maxim of the common law is in fact a fa-
miliar equitable maxim (a variant of the clean hands doctrine), 
and it has always been the function of the law of equity to tem-
per the rigour of the common law, not by contradicting the 
common law (so as to declare a will invalid that the law regards 
                                            
5 This now very famous paper first appeared in the University of Chicago Law 
Review in 1967 and was later included in Taking Rights Seriously (1977). 
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as valid, or alter its terms in ways not permitted by law) but by 
imposing personal obligations that prevent people from exploit-
ing the law to inequitable effect. The principle that no one 
should be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong is by its 
nature a principle of decision, to be used by adjudicators, and 
authoritative adjudicators at that (I find it hard to discern any 
other role for the principle), and its place in the common law, as 
we now describe it following the fusion of the administration of 
law and equity, is as well sourced as that of any other law. 
 
In Law’s Empire6 Dworkin deepened his critique by drawing up-
on the majority’s first ground of decision to argue that the true 
meaning of a statute was always to be determined, not simply by 
reference to the bare language of the statute, as shaped by rele-
vant canons of statutory interpretation, but by reference to what 
he described as a practice of constructive interpretation, in which 
a court asks first, which principle or principles fit the law on the 
question at hand (law here being understood in a pre-interpretive 
sense) and second, which of those principles that fit makes the 
law (here being understood in a post-interpretive sense) the best 
it can be. This practice he called law as integrity. All philosophers 
of law, he contended, were engaged in the project of determin-
ing the grounds of law, and his account of law as integrity was, 
when evaluated against the relevant benchmarks, consistently su-
perior to Hart’s account on that score.  
 
Once again it is a little difficult to see how Riggs itself can be read 
to support that claim, at least without a good deal of legerdemain. 
It is simply not true to say that all philosophers of law are com-
mitted to the identification of the grounds of law, as Dworkin 
understood those. As far as Hart was concerned, identifying the 
grounds of law (in Dworkin’s sense of intellectual inputs) was the 
task of law-makers, be they the legislature or the judiciary. Hart’s 
                                            
6 1986 
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project, in his delineation of the rule of recognition, was to iden-
tify the sources of law, or more precisely, to identify the ways in 
which the sources of law are identified by legal officials, so as to 
identify the law-makers whose task it is to consider grounds of 
law and reach decisions on the basis of them. In Hart’s hands, 
sources, one might roughly put it, are institutional; grounds are 
inspirational.  
 
There is no trace of dispute in Riggs over the content of the rule 
of recognition as Hart understood it, for all the rules in the case 
were recognized rules. Dworkin presents the case as a dispute of 
that kind by insisting on reading into the rule of recognition (as 
Hart understood it) a level of detail (how to interpret the outputs 
of a source; how to reconcile the outputs of different sources) 
that on the whole the rule of recognition could not offer an an-
swer to without undermining its own significance. By this means 
he turns Hart’s question (about the validity of law) into 
Dworkin’s question (of what law should be). This is a sleight of 
hand that use of the equivocal term ‘grounds of law’ (which is 
roughly equivocal between institutional grounds and intellectual 
grounds) both conceals and enables. In Dworkin’s hands, that is 
to say in his presentation of Hart, the rule of recognition as Hart 
understood it is called upon to identify the full resources of deci-
sion in every case, and to show how those are to be reconciled. 
This erases the role that Hart intended the rule of recognition to 
play, and leaves legal positivists no question of validity to answer. 
Every legal decision becomes a decision about the content of the 
rule of recognition. 
 
The deeper and more telling question, however, is not whether 
Dworkin was fair to Hart, a question that Dworkin was not the 
sort of combatant to be deeply concerned with, but whether the 
idea of law as integrity possesses the resources needed to identify 
the grounds of law as Dworkin understood them. By his own 
admission, Dworkin loved a distinction (they were vessels for his 
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remarkable intellectual ingenuity) but the distinction between fit 
and justification is a troubling one, in its operation and ordering. 
The dimension of fit is troubling just because it precedes and is 
independent of the question of justification, so presenting for jus-
tification principles that have been identified without justification 
in mind, all of which may be bad ones, in certain settings at least. 
This may indeed be integrity, but if so it makes clear what the 
lives of consistently bad people have so painfully shown, that to 
possess integrity is not necessarily to possess virtue. Less obviously 
perhaps, the dimension of justification is troubling, not simply 
because the options presented to it may well be unworthy ones, 
for that is not its fault, unless and until it succumbs to rationaliz-
ing, but because the process of justification, as Dworkin describes 
it, is not only backward-looking and self-referential, but funda-
mentally idealizing. An idealizing morality is not capable of doing 
the good that much of our living calls for, at least, if we are truly 
to live well (that is, with as much emphasis on the living as on 
the well) and to be truly justified in our doing so. 
 
 
The Problem of Living Well 
 
Joseph Raz has recently, and with characteristic power, outlined 
reasons to believe in the possibility of moral change, by disman-
tling arguments, most notably that from subsumption, that would 
limit morality to what can be explained by reference to existing 
moral understanding.7 The limitation expressed in subsumption 
seeks to preserve both realism about morality and what I have 
called idealism, standardly by taking existing moral understanding 
to a new and higher level of abstraction, a level that is sufficiently 
                                            
7 ‘Can Moral Principles Change?’ (2017) King's College London Law School 
Research Paper 2017-40; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 58/2017. 




general in its account of value as to be capable of including a val-
ue that would otherwise appear to be novel. By this means, it is 
said, we can come to see that the cases of value that we are well 
versed in are in fact part of a more capacious category of value 
than we took them to be, a category that is capacious enough to 
embrace an apparent outlier. The underlying and even more 
basic problem being tackled here is that of the recognition of the 
moral, and Raz is very persuasive in his contention that there are 
sound ways to recognize the moral other than by subsumption, 
most notably by analogy. 
 
Raz’s project here, not for the first time, amounts to something 
of a liberation movement, opening our thought, that about moral 
realism in particular, to possibilities of diversity and change that 
standard practices of reflection would rule out. My present con-
cern, which is at once sympathetic yet ancillary to his, is to pur-
sue the question of what might be good about such a liberation. 
What possibilities for our thought and action does the reality of 
moral change (if that is what it is) give rise to, and in what ways, 
if any, do those possibilities make our moral lives fuller, or richer, 
or more recognizable, or all those things at once? 
 
The standard move, toward idealism, abstraction, disengagement 
in our moral decision-making, is driven by the sense of what the 
moral has to offer to life, of what we and other valuers need to 
attend to in and learn from the moral, so as to live well and make 
our lives genuinely good ones. The less standard move in the 
opposite direction, one that is not accidentally engrained in many 
aspects of our daily life, is animated by something less familiar 
and perhaps less comfortable for a moral realist, a sense of what 
life has to offer to the moral, so as to bring the moral to life, so to 
speak, with all that implies in terms of dynamism and finitude. As 
I see it, each of these two moves, taken in isolation and in gen-
eral, risks not only incompleteness but inadequacy. The former is 
liable to be too bloodless, the latter too bloody. 
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To speak of bringing morality to life risks being both rhetorical 
and overwrought. On the one hand, morality plainly has a life of 
its own without need of assistance from the living, in the sense of 
the flesh and blood living that I have been pointing to. On the 
other hand, but by something of the same token, to speak of life 
without more is simply to prompt the question of just what sort 
of life one has in mind. What kind of life could valuers bring to 
morality that morality did not already possess? The answer, as I 
see it, is the kind of life that is implicit in the very idea of valuers 
and valuing; the life of specificity and finitude that the ideal does 
not partake of but that makes evaluation matter, indeed makes it 
conceivable; the life that requires us to think and to do one thing 
rather than another, and that leaves open-ended the possibilities 
in doing so; the life that contains the ideas of creation and crea-
tivity as its premise and its purpose; the life that makes the moral 
world one that is dynamic as well as static; the life in which the 
same things can be good and bad at once; the life the history of 
which could never be entirely foretold, and that as a result, when 
brought into being and pursued through its course, in small mo-
ments and in great, makes the moral universe rather larger than it 
would or could have been otherwise, for better and for worse. 
 
That is still quite rhetorical so let me be more down to earth. As 
I see it at the heart of the idea and the experience of life is a sense 
of span. We live for a while and within a certain compass. Those 
parameters are what give life its basic outline, its narrative struc-
ture, and less obviously perhaps, its moral imperative. We quite 
unavoidably, but for the most part quite willingly, proceed from 
moment to moment, predicament to predicament, in patterns 
derived from our thoughts and from our actions. Because each of 
us is one person rather than all persons, because we each exist at 
one moment rather than another, because we can never be in 
two places at once, we must decide (if only by way of response 
to what has happened to us in cases when we are passive) and the 
quality of our decision turns in part on our finitude and specifici-
ty, so that our moral worth, which we cannot control or escape, 
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turns in part on matters that could not be known in advance, be-
cause their character is a product and function of our particular, 
and very largely randomly established mortality. All of this is very 
far from ideal, and that is one prominent source of its richness.  
 
We do all these things not on our own but in concert with one 
another, and as a result our finitudes are multiplied, our moral 
prospects complicated and enriched, by practices of association. 
In this way we collectively beget cultures and aspects of culture. 
To live well in and through these cultures and their aspects very 
often requires us to master the intricacies of their goodness and 
badness, intricacies that distance cultures in varying degrees from 
the ideal and from one another, in their moral successes as much 
as in their moral failures. So when we pursue a skill, physical or 
intellectual; have feelings about what we do and where we find 
ourselves; develop personal relationships with other people, other 
animals, or even places; in general seek to live well, so as to have 
what we take to be a good life; we necessarily work within con-
tingencies of time, space, and incident, few of which are entirely 
or exactly shared with other people at other times and places, 
(disconcerting though it often is to realize just how far one’s life 
is a type, so that matters that one took to be particular to oneself 
are revealed as cultural or generational). Far from being morally 
inert, these contingencies seem to shape deeply our sense of the 
worth of our lives, the more so the more embedded we become 
in them, through investment in roles, people, places, and much 
else, so as to detail, or flesh out as we often and revealingly put it, 
the contours of our engagement in and appreciation of the arte-
facts and practices that we share with our moral neighbours and 
companions, our fellow travellers in the appreciation of value.  
 
To put it at its most trivial, there was a time when there was no 
wet mop, a time when there was no terrazzo flooring, a time 
when there was no question of the skill that could be developed, 
mastered and transmitted to others, and a time, therefore, when 
there was no question of the aspect of value that such a skill can 
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give rise to, an aspect of value that in its shadings is not simply an 
arbitrary variant of a more general and abstract value of cleaning 
and cleanliness (or something like that), but rather the legacy of a 
particular moment and culture. Indeed there is probably a sense 
in which the value (and disvalue) of the practices that my brother 
stepped into and briefly shared was local to Gatineau, to Public 
Works, and indeed to the company of M. Nault and his fellows.8 
These are the things that give life its flavour, and there seems no 
reason to deny and good reason to accept that they form a large 
part of its value, as they routinely appear to us to do. 
 
The example here is deliberately trivial, just because so much of 
our lives and their worth are similarly trivial. The point that I am 
trying to make is one that could be rather more easily established, 
for this audience at least, by reference to more ambitious practic-
es, such as those of art, music, fine craftsmanship, and intellectual 
enquiry. Yet that would surely be to slip into something like the 
habit of elevation and abstraction in our reflections about what to 
think and how to act that I have sought to call into question, at 
least far enough to temper somewhat our embrace of it. It isn’t 
just that what are sometimes referred to as the finer things in life 
are apt to be self-referential in the hands of most philosophers. It 
is that they are too easily thought of as approaches to and imper-
fect instantiations of the ideal. That is not the only or best way to 
understand even these finer things. For those who are as old as I 
am, or are of an historical turn of mind, and to return to an ex-
ample that I have relied on elsewhere, there is a Bob Dylan song 
that seeks to deny that art attains greatness only as and when it 
partakes of the divine: ‘But Mona Lisa must have had the high-
way blues, you can tell by the way she smiles’.9 The highway 
blues: how redolent of value that is, and how very particular in 
its time, place and ultimate flavour. Even Bob Dylan would have 
                                            
8 Returning to the question of skilled labour raised in the text at note 1. 
9 ‘Visions of Johanna’ (1966) 
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passed on it a few years later, when Woody Guthrie meant less to 
him. 
 
The emotions too are often no less local than skilled labour. It is 
a little difficult to be properly precise here, because to be adept in 
the emotions is to be deeply versed in their local expression, for a 
family, for a community, for a national culture, in something the 
same way as it is to be adept at humour, so that it is as difficult to 
speak accurately of foreign emotions as it is to speak accurately of 
a foreign sense of humour. Nevertheless, anyone with experience 
of different generations and the quintessentially different outlooks 
that they often have on significant aspects of life, at least in all but 
the most stable cultures, will be familiar with the fact that such 
people do similar things in what are often fundamentally different 
ways, so that the intergenerational unities are quite shallow while 
their divergences are profound. It is a small and possibly unrelia-
ble example, but I remember noticing when young that while 
my grandparents and parents distinguished as I did (and as we are 
all bound to) between their positive and negative states of mind, 
their vocabularies were very different from mine, and the differ-
ence in our vocabularies tracked a difference in the quality of our 
evaluations. My grandparents spoke of joy and sorrow, my par-
ents of happiness and unhappiness, while I at the time tended to 
speak of being up or down. Different values are at stake here, 
and to a great extent they are not just culturally rooted but cul-
turally inspired. 
 
I have written elsewhere, in the context of considering the worth 
of equality, of the distinction that is to be drawn between value 
(and disvalue) and goodness (and badness). Goodness and badness 
are reflections of the way we live, of the artefacts that our lives 
give rise to, including the artefact of their very existence, but also 
the physical artefacts that we call goods and the cultural artefacts 
we call practices, in short the artefacts of the ongoing exchange 
between life and value, value and life. It is life and its very many 
by-products that can be either good or bad, or both at once. So 
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one could say that it is life that brings goodness and badness into 
the world, and in doing so generates possibilities for value, partly 
within the boundaries of existing values, but also by aberrations, 
in something the same way that genetic variation generates new 
lives and from time to time, and through what might otherwise 
have been abnormality, such very new ways of being as amount 
to new species.  
 
That sounds grandiose, but it is also and no less meaningfully or 
importantly, entirely trivial. When we do what we do from day 
to day, some of it inventive, much of it repetitive, and when we 
are a little lucky, we lead good lives. The flavour of those lives, 
in all their minutiae, is trivially distinctive, and that is what gives 
us reason to value them as our own, while being properly modest 
about their significance. We matter even as we do not matter. 
 
Often this is quite inarticulate. It is one of those puzzles whether 
the facts of our lives call for valuation or whether the value of 
our lives calls for facts. Do we need to have an idea of something 
in order to be able to reflect on its worth, or is an idea something 
that would be difficult, perhaps impossible to comprehend with-
out some sense of the value that it could give rise to, or as Finnis 
might put it, some sense of its point? A solution to the puzzle is 
not required. For what it’s worth, my prejudice tends to run in 
favour of the precedence of value. There seem to be many things 
that we can feel and do entirely inarticulately, from simply lying 
in the sun, or sporting in the water, to actively engaging in com-
plicated activities that depend for much of their value on sponta-
neity and improvisation. Pace advocates of mindfulness, it is often 
better not to think about things at all, and no less often better not 
to think about them too much. That, after all, is what other ani-
mals seem to do much of the time, and what even plants may do, 
as long as one is prepared, as I am, to think of plants as valuers 
whose valuations happen to be biologically determined, so as to 
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lead them to turn toward the sun, for example, and in doing so 
to convert the value of sunlight into the goodness of a flower.10  
 
And yet of course that is only prejudice on my part. It seems to 
be the case that human beings are fundamentally not only valuers 
but pretty conceptual creatures, so that the smallest of children 
are as keen on naming as they are on valuing and often more ac-
complished at it, although not always. ‘See car’, I am told that I 
said as a very small child, looking out the window. ‘See truck’. 
‘See ment mixer’. Naming is running ahead of value here. 
 
All of this goes to the practice of evaluation no less than to what 
falls to be evaluated. There is no underlying algorithm to specify 
the shape of evaluation, although there are many working prac-
tices of evaluation, each of which fits, with greater or lesser suc-
cess, values and practices of different kinds, while at the same 
time helping to characterize the culture of which it is a product, 
and thereby helping to contribute to that culture’s worth or lack 
of worth, or more precisely, to the distinctive quality of its worth 
or lack of worth. Some cultures place great weight on the fact of 
embedding, using social pressure to enforce conventions across a 
wide range of practices, great and small. To use a trivial example 
once again, there is a right way to make a sauce, one will be told 
in such cultures, and if one presses for a reason what one will be 
pointed to is a custom, which will be treated as if it were a rea-
son. There is clearly both good and bad in this. The good is sure-
ly to be found in the cultural stability that is generated thereby, 
in the mutual recognition of the members of that culture, and in 
the attendant goods that stability and recognition can give rise to. 
The bad lies in the rigidity, the closure, the lack of questioning, 
and the further consequences for the good in terms of the several 
losses of cultural adaptability, social mobility, accommodation of 
diversity, repression and unfulfilled lives.  
                                            
10 For the full development of this thought see Timothy Macklem and John 
Gardner, ‘Human Disability’, 25 King’s Law Journal 60 (2014). 
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Other cultures, such as those that are globally dominant at the 
moment, place great weight on abstract ideals (such as equality, 
democracy and human rights) that not only take the place of 
former embedded practices (such as tribalism, oligarchy and cul-
tural taboos) but also treat them as both unnecessary and irration-
al. Trivial examples are hard to come by in this setting, because 
the idealizing outlook is by its very nature dedicated to denying 
their significance in its operation. One must ask more generally 
about the ways in which our lives have been shaped by com-
mitment to an outlook that all rational beings are currently ex-
pected to share as a universal, which it is in its moral status but 
which it need not be in its engagement. Once again there is both 
good and bad in this. Our world is fluid (but then also uncertain 
and angst-ridden), adaptable (but shallow), open to all (but 
committed to no-one in particular), inclusive of all (but without 
the benefits that exclusiveness can give rise to), comprehensible 
to all (but without the benefits that the arcane can give rise to), 
and so on. 
 
The contrast that I have been trying to draw is merely illustrative 
of certain familiar instantiations of different approaches to evalua-
tion. Once it is recognized that evaluation is in many respects a 
social practice, one that itself falls to be evaluated, it becomes 
necessary to confront, in some detail, the different values that 
different practices of evaluation give rise to. Sometimes this con-
frontation is liable to take place at the boundaries of a culture, 
most obviously so in the case of embedded cultures. In fluid, lib-
eral cultures such as ours, however, the confrontation is bound to 
take place at the frontiers of our individual minds (for that is the 
framework of responsibility that those cultures have assigned to 
us, so as to bring our lives as close as possible to their model of 
rationality), and so is bound to take shape not only in the deci-
sions that we each make about what to think and do, but in the 
higher-level decisions that we make about how to decide and 
with what frame of reference to go about doing so, subject of 
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course to the claims upon us of the very many social practices in 
which, for all our idealizing convictions, we remain necessarily 
embedded, including the framework of the law and of legal sys-
tem, as those things are severally and distinctively constituted and 
practiced in different cultures and jurisdictions.  
 
So to take a prominent contemporary example, the practice of 
seeking to punish sexual transgressions through a public shaming 
by crowd action, rather than through the intervention of the law, 
represents a decision by the individuals in question to shift the 
framework of decision-making on this issue from the idealizing 
to the embedded. People do not pursue this path as a second-best 
to the operation of the law. Rather they pursue it because they 
regard it as superior, in its operations as much as its outcome. 
The fact that they are the authors of the criteria of evaluation, in 
all its detail, authors of the process of evaluation, and ultimately 
authors of their own remedy, is central to their movement. To 
put it in Dworkinian terms, they are not in any way prepared to 
turn to Hercules for relief. Those who believe that there is at 
least something to regret in this approach need to engage in the 
arguments about its strengths and weaknesses as a mode of evalu-
ation. They cannot simply rule it out of court. To do so would 
be not merely strategically inadequate but morally unsound. Or 
so I am proposing. 
 
 
The Problems of Integrity and of Purpose 
 
Observations such as these have something to offer to those of us 
who are engaged in the practice of law, or in reflection upon that 
practice, in two ways. First, law is a practice of decision-making, 
and our understanding of it as such is necessarily affected by the 
views that we hold about the appropriateness of different modes 
of decision-making. So different legal cultures can and, as we all 
know, do adopt different approaches to legal decision-making, 
legislative and judicial, approaches that have come over time to 
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characterize their legal traditions, in the many ways with which 
scholars and practitioners, particularly those with experience of 
transnational and comparative law, are entirely familiar, traditions 
the appropriateness of which is open to evaluation in the several 
ways in which evaluation may legitimately take place, some of 
which will be regarded as alien and others as appropriate by the 
legal cultures in question. The appropriateness of an approach to 
evaluation is liable to be measured on two levels, in terms of its 
consonance with the local forms of legal practice, and in terms of 
its consonance with local practices of evaluation, some of which 
will in turn be distinctively legal. That consonance is possibly but 
not necessarily suspect. It will obscure some matters and illumi-
nate others. So, for example, some legal cultures (indeed all legal 
cultures to some degree) will be embedded, so that the way that 
things are done around here (to adopt the common expression) is 
central to their operation, will regard that embeddedness as en-
tirely appropriate, and may well further regard as appropriate 
embedded practices of evaluation, including those of legal eval-
uation. They will not necessarily be wrong in any of this, even 
though a good deal of it will inevitably be self-regarding, by very 
reason of its embeddedness. Indeed one suspects that it is almost 
bound to be the case that they are likely to be right about much 
of it, for the embeddedness of a practice is almost bound to beget 
a need for correspondingly embedded approaches to its under-
standing and critical assessment, in some respects at least. 
 
Second, and more to the present point, the practice of reflection 
on the law, the practice that in academic circles tends to claim 
for itself the name of jurisprudence, is itself and in turn affected 
by the same views. For someone like Dworkin of course, these 
two perspectives merge into one, given his conviction that law is 
but jurisprudence writ small. The real strengths and weaknesses 
of Dworkin’s account, which are to be found, on the one hand, 
in the idealizing picture it offers of law as something that is to be 
identified with its own aspiration, and on the other hand, in the 
gulf between that picture and the everyday reality of what aspira-
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tion means on the ground, thought by thought, action by action, 
are ultimately located in the idea of law as integrity which, both 
seductively and disconcertingly, is in many ways anything but. 
 
Recall that Dworkin begins with a distinction that he regards as 
essential to the interpretation and development of not only the 
law, but every cultural text, whether it be aesthetic or practical, 
namely, the distinction between the requirement of fit and the 
requirement of justification. That distinction is rather more odd 
than it treats itself as being, for in our everyday moral lives fit is 
rarely if ever separate from justification (we think that our clothes 
fit because that is part of what we think makes them look good; 
we speak more broadly of fit and proper reactions, in ways that 
make clear that those two elements are presented as going hand 
in hand because the role of each is in part to shape the other), 
while in those everyday lives justification is rarely if ever separate 
from fit, for tailoring is a fundamental part of the idea of justifica-
tion as we practice it (we think that justification must be such as 
could be offered to the particular person or persons who are its 
subjects, so that we make sure, for example, to offer to victims 
justifications that take full account of their distinctive history and 
predicament). To seek to sever these everyday partnerships, not 
as a thought experiment, but as the heart of a programme for the 
life of the law as it should be lived in practice, as a guide to the 
exercise of judicial citizenship at its most admirable, is, it seems 
to me, to seek to take from each of those elements the crucial 
overtone that commends it to us as moral beings. It is to take 
from fit that which makes fit capable of being something worthy, 
while taking from justification that which makes justification 
something that is capable of life, in all the ways that I have 
sought to explore above. Let me explain what I have in mind. 
 
In Dworkin’s hands, fit becomes a matter of searching for the 
principle or principles that best fit the law as it currently exists, at 
first very locally and then as and when necessary by stepping back 
to more general and more comprehensive views of the law, legal 
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history and political history. The quest is always for fit, so that 
one steps back not to find a better principle but to find a better 
fit, officially at least. This results in satisfactory principles if and to 
the extent that one’s legal culture is satisfactory, in its detail (for 
that is where the quest for fit may well stop) as much as in its 
broad outlines. One would need not only to be idealistic but 
chauvinistically so to be at all optimistic about the outcomes of 
such a project, for laws are the product of our politics, explicitly 
so in the case of statutes, implicitly so in the case of the common 
law, and the history of our politics, like the history of so much of 
human endeavour, is something that even generous observers are 
bound to describe as flawed at best.  
 
Fit is not my principal topic here, and much has been said about 
it elsewhere, so there is no need for me to pursue its difficulties. 
It seems to me that there is only one slightly rueful observation 
that might be worth developing a little further. In articulating his 
picture of the process of constructive interpretation Dworkin had 
a choice to make in his treatment of fit. Grant for the moment 
and for the sake of argument his desire to approach the issues of 
fit and justification separately. He needed to arrive at a model of 
what he described as law as integrity, a model of what he took to 
be the proper interaction between fit and justification, justifica-
tion and fit, that would be at once recognizable (so as to be plau-
sible as a description of the fact of law as it presently exists in a 
particular setting which, for Dworkin, was that of the United 
States) and virtuous. He might have given priority to the virtu-
ous, but he chose instead to give priority to the recognizable. 
One can see the large temptation in the immense capital for a 
progressive politics that he hoped to realize thereby, while still 
believing that it was a temptation that should have been resisted. 
 
It is Dworkin’s treatment of justification that is perhaps more in-
teresting, however, because more revealing. The temptations that 
his account gives in to here are not the immediate ones of the 
potential gains to be made in terms of domestic judicial politics, 
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but rather the broader and more insidious (because less visible) 
temptations of twentieth century idealism, in which the everyday 
came to be archetypically regarded as politically suspect, in which 
the idea of modernity came to be thought of as in just opposition 
to ideas of custom and tradition, in a vision of moral progress. As 
Dworkin would have it, when more than one principle fits, as a 
solution to the problem at hand, the task of a court, exemplified 
by his ideal judge, Hercules, is to ask which of those principles 
would make the law the best it can be, once again stepping back 
as far as is needed to be able to appraise accurately the principles 
on offer. That principle is the law. 
 
There are three significant difficulties in this approach, only the 
last of which I will dwell on. First, the identification of a princi-
ple as the one that makes the law the best it can be is possible 
only if the principles in question are broadly commensurable. 
This makes Dworkin’s account of constructive interpretation 
something of a non-starter for value pluralists, for whom deci-
sions involve choices of kind as well as degree. Yet there is more. 
In Dworkin’s project, it is essential that law be self-determining, 
because that fact is vital to the immediate political capital that he 
hoped to realize for a progressive politics. The obvious problem 
with this proposal, and the single right answer that it is said to 
yield, a problem that value pluralists are particularly sensitive to 
but that others also share, is that in the bulk of life as we know it 
decision appears to be necessary to the reaching of moral conclu-
sions. The less obvious but perhaps even more telling difficulty, 
to which I will return, is that the role of decision in our lives is 
surely morally desirable in itself. The presence of a single right 
answer, were it actually the fact of the matter, would erase the 
significance of the decision-maker, and by extension would erase 
the significance of all the rich rational detail that makes it possible 
to distinguish the moral character and function of one decision-
maker from another. Remember that Dworkin’s picture of con-
structive interpretation is not a picture that is supposed to be pe-
culiar to the law, but to the contrary, a picture of evaluative 
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judgment more generally, one that explains just how the next 
chapter in a novel should be written, and by extension, the next 
chapter in a life. In both those cases it matters not to constructive 
interpretation just who writes the chapter: its proper content is 
the same. What room here for the author? What room for the 
fact that my life is mine? Someone else would be just as good or 
better at writing the script, not in all cases but surely in many. 
 
The second difficulty with Dworkin’s account of justification lies 
in its implicit yet powerful conservative bent. The quest for the 
best principle is one that explicitly canvases the world as it is and 
as it has been. The next brushstroke that a painter should take is 
one that it is to be determined by reference to every brushstroke 
that has ever been taken, not only as a matter of fit, but as a mat-
ter of justification. The life of an artist as so envisioned would 
become a matter of finding new implications for existing aesthet-
ic values, and life in general would become a matter of discover-
ing new, yet morally merely arbitrary, instantiations of the value 
of life as it has always been lived. It is possible to think of certain 
parts of the law (such as bills of rights) this way, because it is pos-
sible to think that the value of those particular parts of the law is 
to be found, to some degree at least, in their capacity to conserve 
certain political goods, so as to delay the amendment of those 
goods let alone their destruction. Yet it seems to me, and I doubt 
that I am unusual in this respect, that it is not at all plausible to 
think of life in general this way, and that it is close to impossible 
to think of art this way, for to do so is to strip out from each of 
those things the value of creativity and the significance of voice. 
 
That brings to me to what I see as the final and most troubling 
difficulty in Dworkin’s account of justification which, ironically, 
is the obverse of what I take to be its chief attraction for idealists. 
To approach life, even the life of the law, in terms of integrity, 
so as to engage in the justification that constructive interpretation 
calls for, is to enter into a relationship with the moral that takes 
the very life out of the moral. As I have sought to put it above, 
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value comes to life only in the hands of valuers. That is just what 
the world has to offer to morality. It is our existence, and that of 
other valuers, that provides the occasion and the opportunity for 
morality to inhabit the world other than as a potentiality, and 
more than that but also consequently, that gives morality reason 
and opportunity to grow, develop and evolve, through engage-
ment with the facts of existence, large and small. 
 
Decision is not an affliction, something that we would avoid if 
we could. It is the stuff of life. It is through our decisions, in the 
nuanced sense of decision that I have sought to describe above, 
the sense that treats our reactions as among our actions, that we 
articulate our moral character, and so describe our moral life. 
Without decision we would lack a sense not only of authorship 
but of predicament, and without predicament it is hard to see 
how there could be any such thing as responsibility, if responsi-
bility is, as I take it to be, the account that is to be given of our 
engagement with value. It is the exercise of this responsibility in 
our thoughts and in our actions, through the authorship of our 
destiny, individual and collective, that enables us to bring good-
ness into the world (as well as badness, when we exercise respon-
sibility badly). We are all too familiar with the fact that our exist-
ences are very often, and for the pessimistic, characteristically, a 
falling away from value, but we are much less attentive to the 
corollary, that it is those same existences that give rise to the real-
ization and enhancement of value. That is just what makes the 
world a beautiful place, to the extent that it is so. Otherwise the 
beauty and the place would never be in a position to come to-
gether, and know one another. 
 
All this is as true for lawyers as it is for other human beings. To 
be an actor in a legal system is to play a role of some kind in the 
collective exercise of responsibility for a certain strand of social 
life, that of the recognition, maintenance and development of a 
set of norms that is sufficiently distinct from other norms, in its 
origins and status, to enable it to serve purposes that would be 
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served differently, perhaps less well, perhaps not at all, by rival 
sets of norms. In the exercise of this role it is the quality of deci-
sion that makes legal norms good and bad, and that quality is a 
product of moral perceptiveness in decision-making, fine-grained 
and large. The balance that is struck between those two extremes 
of granularity (and everything in between them), from issue to 
issue, decision to decision, comes over time to characterize cer-
tain cultures and sub-cultures, social, political and legal, and those 
institutions that contribute to their development, from legisla-
tures to courts, from lower courts to higher ones, from legal ac-
tors to legal critics. 
 
Without the role of decision there would be no American legal 
system for Dworkin to speak to and explain, or for the rest of us 
to compare and analogize to our own legal systems. That is what 
the aspect of fit, as Dworkin describes it, implicitly recognizes 
but explicitly misrepresents, by removing the question of fit, and 
responsibility for its exercise, from the question of justification, 
where in fact it performs the vital task of humanizing the moral 
and making it our own, and assigning it an independent and iso-
lated role that has the effect of valorizing culture without attend-
ing to the reasons for its value and disvalue. As Dworkin presents 
it, constructive interpretation, in law and in life, makes our moral 
world smaller and more self-regarding than it ought to be, while 
at the same time and by the same token making us passive rather 
than active participants in it. Surely Dworkin’s own remarkably 
inventive and distinctive intellectual legacy, in and of itself, gives 
the lie to this view. Is it at all possible to believe that the various 
chapters of Law’s Empire, for example, the ideas developed there, 
and the potent vision that sustained them, did not ultimately de-
pend on the vitality, fluency, and creativity of Ronald Dworkin 
himself? Do we not have him to thank for them, both for better 
and for worse? Did Dworkin really believe, having granted equal 
competence, absence of agenda, and an unwillingness to act as his 
amanuensis (for anything else would not amount to constructive 
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interpretation as Dworkin describes it), that John Finnis could 
have alternated with him in the writing of that book to much the 
same effect? Or more precisely and more fairly, that some other 
writer, a literary Hercules, could have rendered the ideas present 
there at least as well and probably better? And if this last is some-
thing that Dworkin could possibly agree to, as he might have 
done if he was prepared to think of his life as an approach to the 
ideal, should the rest of us concur, or should we think that there 
was something quite special about Ronald Dworkin, something 
that infused his work, and that would not have existed in quite 
the way that it did but for the various accidents of fortune that 
came to constitute his mind? What reason otherwise for relative 
strangers such as myself to mourn his passing? 
 
A couple of concluding observations. I have consistently spoken 
of courts generally but this is to fail to give weight to the fact that  
Dworkin’s focus is on appellate courts, which are institutionally 
something of an ambiguous case. The ambiguity makes appellate 
courts rather more plastic in the hands of their interpreters than 
are some institutions, and that may have suited Dworkin. It does 
not alter the fact that appellate courts, no less than trial courts, are 
attentive to questions of fit in the patterns of their justifications. 
Appellate courts derive the fine-grained aspects of their decisions 
from the legislature on the one hand and from trial courts on the 
other. Two things follow from this. First, while the public face 
of appellate courts emphasizes their distance from fine-grained 
factual determinations, as confirmation of their supervisory rather 
than competitive institutional role, the fine-grained remains pre-
sent in their judgments, albeit derivatively so. One can see this in 
the care with which appellate courts grant leave to appeal (to the 
extent that they control their own dockets), so as to make sure 
that the large national issues that they are asked to determine are 
grounded on what the courts regard as good facts. Second, both 
the public face and the actual decision-making of appellate courts 
constitute a shifting frontier of attention to the significance of 
different approaches to decision-making, a frontier that is as con-
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tentious as is the political culture in a given society. One can see 
this in the debates that take place about the attention that is paid, 
or ought to be paid, by those courts to the law of other jurisdic-
tions and to international law in the development of the consti-
tutional cultures of their own jurisdictions. In Canada this plays 
out in terms of the attention that ought to be paid to decisions 
taken under the American Bill of Rights; in the United States it 
plays out in terms of the attention that ought to be paid to cer-
tain decisions by international courts. To notice this is part of 
what it means to notice, correctly, that the appellate courts are 
fundamentally political (albeit not party political), and locally so.  
 
Second, while I have focused on Dworkin in my comments, be-
cause the architecture of his theory is so explicitly isolating and 
purifying, the points that I have been seeking to make are in no 
sense ad hominem ones. They are also an issue for legal positivism, 
where they gain their purchase in debates about the purpose of 
law. To assign a purpose to a practice, whether accurately or in-
accurately, is to impose a requirement of fit on the practice, ar-
chetypically a more or less conservative fit, in which the practice 
is expected to be something that it has always been, rather than 
to recognize it as open-ended, as practices are in fact more or less 
bound to be in their inception, maintenance and development, 
simply by reason of their mortality: new aspects of the practice, 
new occasions for value, and sometimes even new values being 
born in the shape of new or altered purposes for the practice, 
even as old aspects of the practice die by reason of their relative 
neglect, whether out of cultural restlessness, or a shifting sense of 
cultural relevance as other connected practices themselves alter, 
in mutually informing patterns, sometimes to be remembered 
and perhaps revived in one form or another, sometimes to be 
forgotten.   
 
It is a notable feature of Joseph Raz’s treatment of law and legal 
system that he never suggests that the purpose of law is to serve 
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as an authority. Instead he explains the ways in which compli-
ance with the law, the ways in which doing or refraining from 
doing something just because the law has told one to, may be 
rational, so that it may be rational to make laws and to observe 
laws for the sake of the value of the authority they provide. That 
is to take no official position upon, and so leave open, the ques-
tion of what values inspired the creation of legal practice (assum-
ing that such a question could have any kind of determinate an-
swer) and in turn the question of what values the practice might 
be capable of giving rise to, now or in the future. Those are 
questions to which answers can be given only ever provisionally, 
and only through the constantly shifting shape of our social lives. 
 
 
The Problem of our Times 
 
The currents of this debate, or something like it, seem to me to 
be particularly active at the moment, as much of the world veers 
between the enlightened and the atavistic, as proper frameworks 
for sound collective decision-making. Just where those currents 
might lead us is as yet quite unclear, and likely to remain so, for 
the small fragments of social history in which we are embedded, 
and in which we are reasonably well versed, are compatible with 
many different larger histories, a good number of which remain 
entirely plausible prospects at the moment, and are likely to do so 
until they are taken over by a new set of long-term uncertainties. 
That means that, contrary to the apparent spirit of much of this 
paper, any decisions that we might currently make will be only 
contingently connected to those larger histories, and in ways that 
are likely to surprise and perhaps even dismay us. I say contrary 
to the apparent spirit just because in truth one of the implications 
of due attention to the fine-grained is that larger histories ought 
to be accepted as matters of contingency. To attempt to speak to 
them directly would be to open up possibilities for error that 
those committed to the fine-grained seek to avoid. Nevertheless 
it is always a good idea even for the most locally minded of us to 
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have one eye to the horizon, and it is part of the purpose of this 
paper to suggest modest ways in which at least some aspects of 
the standardly accepted contrast between the claims of modernity 
and those of its atavistic critics, between the ideal and the every-
day, might be illuminated and perhaps even constructively mut-
ed, in a manner that we all already recognize and have a decent 
working understanding of.  
 
So there are many good ways to approach a situation such as that 
which arose in Riggs, many attractive ways in which to apply the 
claims of the general principle that no-one shall profit from his 
own wrong. That principle could not be brought to bear other 
than by attention to the nature of the profit in the case at hand, 
and the character of the wrong. Suppose the wrong was a mercy 
killing of one spouse by the other. Suppose further that although 
well intentioned the mercy killing was unjustified. The ending of 
the life in such a case might have been driven by the same quality 
of tenderness for the welfare of the other that animated the vic-
tim’s testamentary provision, notwithstanding its wrongfulness. 
Courts since Riggs have gone both ways on the issue, not because 
they took different views of the general principle, but rather be-
cause they took the view that the principle gained life through its 
application to the facts, to which it was bound to respond as part 
of its being. And yet none of the facts to which the principle was 
called upon to respond would have any purchase but for the 
presence of the general rule and the moral perception that it em-
bodied. That is why (or at least part of why) decision is so diffi-
cult and deeply resistant to schematization (resistant because most 
schematization is arbitrary, albeit that it may quite possibly give 
rise to value after the fact), but it is also why the exercise of deci-
sion, and the consequences of that exercise, can be so valuable. 
